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The Insanity Defense 
Guilty by Reason of Hinckley? 
Anyone who believes that the criminal process is 
merely a conveyor-belt scheme for dealing with the 
seamy side, and not a lens for continuous, fierce moral 
struggle, may well rethink the matter in light of John 
Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal and the ensuing reaction. One 
cannot ordinarily measure the strength of society's col-
lective retributive impulse when a highly visible de-
fendant is convicted; indeed, it is the function of the 
criminal conviction to channel that impulse in a more-
or-less civilized way. "Hinckley's been convicted," we 
might have said. "Good. Let us get on to Bobby's ball-
game." The acquittal, however, uncovered the depth of 
fear, rage, and moral indignation, now without insti-
tutionalized expression, within all of us. Like electric-
ity deprived of its destination, these emotions broke 
out in all directions seeking new outlets for their energy. 
Nor can this reaction be wholly accounted for by the 
fact that President Reagan was the intended victim. 
Clearly, Hinckley is viewed in part as a surrogate for 
all perpetrators of violence, Reagan, Brady and the 
others as surrogates for the potential victim in all of 
us, and the acquittal as symptomatic of a system that 
cannot deal with crime. If the President is not exempt 
from such violence, can anyone feel safe? 
Frustrated by the outcome, many people seemed to 
say, "If John Hinckley isn't guilty, then someone or 
something else is." Nothing escaped completely un-
sullied- the jury, psychiatry, the criminal process in 
general, and, above all, the insanity defense. 
The most immediate attack was on the individual 
jurors. As I listened to the call-in shows the evening of 
and day after the verdict, with caller after caller reg-
istering outrage and shock at the outcome, it occurred 
to me that many of the callers' comments presupposed 
that the jurors in the Hinckley trial had been shipped 
in from Venus. They did not know that "defendants 
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just claim to be insane to get off the hook" or that "psy-
chiatrists and lawyers are really streetwalkers in ex-
pensive suits" or that "everybody is a little insane, 
really." (Some of the callers provided persuasive evi-
dence for this last point.) But a case against the jurors 
could not long be maintained. It became clear (largely 
because this jury was uncharacteristically vocal) that 
the jurors were not ingenues, that they had not brought 
less to their decision than the callers, but more. Street 
wisdom was not lacking, but it had been tempered by 
the solemnity attendant upon making a morally serious 
judgment. Juror Nathalia Brown stated during deliber-
ations, "The issue is not whether he was a little off, or 
whether this poem or that one didn't make sense. He 
shot those people, he shot them on purpose, he planned 
the whole thing out. He should be punished. What 
gives here! The man is just a manipulator. Ain't nothing 
wrong with him." This lady ain't from Venus, either, 
but she ultimately voted to acquit. 
The Mora/Issue of Responsibility 
The frustration focused on the insanity defense, 
aided by the statement of juror Maryland Copelin, 
who closed the jury's defense by saying: "We felt locked 
in by the law." The law that locked in Ms. Copelin and 
the others is the insanity defense. Overnight, move-
ments in scores of forums arose to abolish or weaken 
the defense. My purpose herein is to examine the funda-
mental underpinnings of the insanity defense, to evalu-
ate the various proposals being made for its modifi-
cation, and to suggest one change myself. My thesis 
is that all current proposals either misunderstand, or 
are willing for expediency's sake to jettison, the core 
idea of a criminal law by ignoring or hiding the moral 
issue of responsibility. The proposal made herein is to 
implement an old, but untried, approach which pre-
sents the moral question with a clarity that cannot be 
sidestepped. 
The most radical proposal, already adopted in two 
states (Idaho and Montana) is abolition of the insanity 
defense. This solution is a straightforward instrumental 
attack on the perceived problem of violent offenders. 
Although this solution draws great political impetus 
from the Hinckley case, it is a dangerous solution, 
negates the basic purpose of the criminal law, and rests 
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on a tacit premise which is simply not true. If a man 
had leprosy, surely we would isolate him to prevent 
contamination of others. While this may not be fair to 
him in a very strict sense, his confinement as an instru-
ment for the public good is clearly defensible. But, 
unless we held fast to earlier cultural notions that his 
disease was a manifestation of some grave personal sin, 
we would not see as necessary a ritual of moral con-
demnation. A criminal conviction is, of course, just 
such a ritual. The eminent scholar Henry Hart helped 
expose the 1950s myth that the peno-correction process 
was the rehabilative technique of a compassionate so-
ciety by stating "What distinguishes a criminal from a 
civil sanction and all that distinguishes it ... is the 
judgment of community condemnation which accom-
panies and justifies its imposition." Of course it is more 
difficult to diagnose insanity than leprosy, and mis-
takes will be made, but it is as necessary today as ever 
before, from a moral standpoint, to distinguish between 
people who are sick and people who are bad. 
None of this proves that the dangerously insane need 
not be confined, like the leper. Of course he must, but 
it perverts the criminal process (and thus weakens it 
for all purposes) to make it do the job. Involuntary 
commitment procedures are available in all jurisdic-
tions; in most, a criminal acquittal on grounds of in-
sanity automatically triggers such a process. 
The criminal process's value as a technique for de-
ciding highly charged moral issues is weakened, if not 
destroyed, when used as the all-purpose agency of 
social control. Note that 50 per cent of the police and 
prosecutorial resources in this country are expended 
to fight gambling, prostitution, and low-level drug 
traffic. The main "benefit" from this is the alienation 
of large groups of people who do not adopt the law's 
morality as their own. In fact, the abolition of the in-
sanity defense is even worse. Although people may 
honestly disagree about the morality of gambling, I 
am aware of no current serious argument that people 
who act as a result of mental illness are morally culp-
able. Moreover, if the criminal process were to be used 
as a wide-ranging body for social control , it could not 
work with its current rules. The accused is given a pro-
fessional representative whether he can afford one or 
not, proof is required "beyond a reasonable doubt," 
and the decision is made by a jury of twelve. We cannot 
solve too many social problems with so cumbersome an 
apparatus as this. As a matter of fact, the rules and 
trappings of a criminal trial would appear absolutely 
ridiculous to us were we not persuaded that conviction 
carried a powerful moral pronouncement about the ac-
cused and that such pronouncements are only tragically 
made to innocent persons. 
Another proposal-to remove insanity questions from 
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the guilt phase of the trial and use it during sentencing 
to mitigate punishment-is subject to the same objec-
tions. Criminal responsibility is a moral question an-
terior to any punishment. It ought to be decided by the 
jury, the community's representative, and not by a 
judge. Of course, a judge may choose to reduce the 
sentence for a defendant who, while suffering some 
mental illness, is not so ill as to avoid completely any 
moral condemnation. The proposal, however, makes the 
criminal process incoherent-the guilt phase, designed 
to deal with moral questions, now avoids the most 
fundamental one of all. The criminal process absolutely 
depends on an image of man free to make choices. 
Many recognized defenses, such as self-defense, duress, 
or accident, indicate that we are not interested in pun-
ishing conduct which was not the function of choice, 
or in which choice was restricted among intolerable 
alternatives. The notion of a separate system for juve-
niles rests on the understanding that anti-social actions 
by certain people indicate therapeutic, not retributive, 
response. To suggest the culpability of those who act 
wholly from illness, illness which by its nature excludes 
all socially-tolerable choices, is to suggest that individual 
fault is foreign to the inquiry. Perhaps even worse, it 
might suggest that people are ultimately to be blamed 
for their illnesses. 
Burying the Essential Moral Question 
The proposal of a new verdict form- "guilty but 
mentally ill" (GBMI) - already law in six states, in-
cluding Indiana, will , I think, become law in most 
jurisdictions. When GBMI is in force, a jury in a crimi-
nal trial in which insanity is interposed, is given four 
choices of verdict: 1) "not guilty"; 2) "not guilty by 
reason of insanity"; 3) "guilty"; and 4) "GBMI." The 
defendant found "GBMI" is, for all purposes, deemed 
guilty of the offense. H e is, however, "evaluated" to 
determine whether he should begin his term in jail or 
in a mental institution. If he is sent to the latter, and is 
at any time prior to the expiration of his term released 
therefrom, he is returned to the prison population to 
finish his term. The idea is beguiling-the mentally 
ill defendant is given treatment for his problem but 
cannot be released into society any more quickly than if 
he had been found "guilty." It seems a nice finesse of a 
very difficult problem. 
Closer examination shows that this proposed solu-
tion is either entirely meaningless as a response to the 
perceived problem or, like earlier proposals, buries 
the moral question. When the jury is asked to decide 
from among these four outcomes, it is given the legal 
tests both for "insanity" and for "mental illness." The 
test for insanity most prevalent today (it is the law of 
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Indiana and also of the Hinckley case) is: "A person is 
not responsible for having engaged in prohibited con-
duct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of the conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law." ("Substantial-capacity" test). 
The jury refers to this to decide whether or not the de-
fendant is "not guilty by reason of insanity." In de-
termining whether the defendant is "GBMI," the jury 
is instructed: "mentally ill means having a psychiatric 
disorder which substantially disturbs a person's 
thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs a person's 
ability to function and includes mental retardation." 
The jury must visualize the class of persons who are 
"mentally ill" as larger and wholly inclusive of the 
class of "insane" persons. Definition of the mentally ill 
class does not, however, expressly exclude those who are 
"insane." If the defendant is "mentally ill" but not 
"insane," the jury's task is clear. If the jury believes 
the defendant is "insane," however, it is not told the 
basis for deciding between "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" and "GBMI." If the jury were told that the 
proper outcome in such cases was "not guilty by reason 
of insanity," then GBMI is hardly going to cure Hinck-
ley-like results. On the other hand, if "insane" persons 
can be found "GBMI," the insanity defense is de facto 
abolished. The jury is appeased into believing the de-
fendant will not really be punished, but treated. As a 
matter of fact, there is no guarantee that a defendant 
found GBMI will receive any treatment in a mental 
institution. 
One final proposal would shift the burden of proof 
on the sanity question to the defendant. Indiana, for 
example, requires the state to prove everything else 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," but requires the defend-
ant to prove insanity by a "preponderance of the 
evidence." With all respect, the only purpose for this 
change, which runs contrary to the notion that criminal 
punishment ought depend on community judgment 
"to a moral certainty" and not merely when we are 
"confused" about moral questions, and which begins 
to erode the accusatorial style of Anglo-American 
criminal trials by forcing defendants to "disprove" 
guilt, is to change outcomes. It is based only on the 
speculation that "too many" defendants are acquitted. 
T he often-heard complaint that a defendant need 
only plead insanity and the jury will become so con-
fused as to acquit simply is not empirically support-
able. If one asks experienced criminal defense counsel-
the people, after all, most clearly "in the marketplace" 
for defenses-he will be told that insanity is the defense 
of last resort. It is such both because juries are tradi-
tionally reluctant to accept it, and because, in many 
cases, the penalty for insanity is less desirable to the 
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defendant than the penalty for the crime. One way to 
test this is to search your memory for any case in which 
the defense was raised to a charge other than murder 
or its attempt, the crimes carrying the highest penalty. 
In fact, the Hinckley case is one of only a very few in 
which the defense was interposed to attempted murder. 
Moral, Psychiatric, and Legal Aspects 
My proposal is not to discard nor obscure the moral 
question of responsibility but to make it more clear to 
the jury that such is precisely what they are supposed 
to decide. In an insanity-defense case, three components 
must be managed. First there is a moral component, the 
decision of who is and who is not deserving of punish-
ment. While this judgment may be shared to some ex-
tent, it is the jury which answers the question at its 
core. Second, a clinical, or medical, or psychiatric com-
ponent represented by expert witnesses is needed to 
inform the moral judgment. The legal component has 
two main tasks, each of which it carries out through the 
expression of a "test" for insanity and through rules 
on expert testimony. One task is to provide a standard 
for decision to insure equality across cases, though 
surely this "test" is itself informed by the moral judg-
ment. The second, and perhaps more important, task 
is to mediate between the moral and the psychiatric 
components so that each operates properly within its 
sphere but does not impinge on the other. My conten-
tion is that the law does not do this very well- that, 
instead, the psychiatric component tends to overpower 
the moral one in many cases. 
Note first that "insanity" is not a medical, psychiat-
ric, or clinical term. It is strictly the stating of a legal 
outcome. The only unmistakable symptom of insanity 
i acquittal. A psychiatrist has no greater claim, nor do 
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most want one, to state a person is sane or insane than 
anyone else. In his daily work, he does not use the term 
because it is of no use to him; the range from perfect 
mental health (picture an Eastern mystic sitting, regis-
tering only delta waves for days on end) to complete 
mental disintegration (watch Gong Show reruns) is a 
continuum, marked by signposts, to be sure, but con-
taining no bright lines. If you asked a psychiatrist 
whether or not a particular subject was insane, he would 
ask you first what you meant by the term and, second, 
"for what purpose do you ask?" The law must strike a 
proper balance between community morality (repre-
sented by the jury) and clinical data (delivered by ex-
pert witnesses). Currently, partly because of the un-
certainties of the science of psychiatry and partly be-
cause of the law's inattention to the problem, the expert's 
testimony often drifts away from purely clinical 
material and begins to intrude on the moral question. 
This situation came about only slowly. Until the 1950s, 
the insanity instruction in most jurisdictions foreclosed 
almost all useful clinical input. The chief problem was 
that the "M'Naghten" instruction-which described 
as insane only those who, because of mental disease or 
defect, "could not tell right from wrong"- took account 
only of cognitive impairment, and, even then, only 
cognitive impairment of an excessive and unusual 
kind. The defendant who knew he was acting wrong-
fully but could not, because of illness, control his actions 
was convicted. The psychiatric community complained 
that their testimony was foreclosed by a definition which 
was foreign to their understanding of the problem. 
Most defects, they said, were volitional defects. The law, 
they said in effect, was asking the wrong question. The 
reaction of individual psychiatrists differed. Some 
refused to act as expert witnesses from a feeling that 
they could not, and would not, shed light on the wrong 
question. Others, surely with the aid of lawyers, began 
to fudge their testimony. Once they were themselves 
convinced that the defendant should not be held respon-
sible, they began tailoring their testimony to the "right-
wrong" test. If the law insisted on asking the "wrong" 
question, the witness would answer the "right" question 
to himself and then translate it into "wrong" language. 
In this lay a terrible potential which soon came to 
full flower. The "right" question - should the defendant 
be held responsible?-is not a clinical question at all, 
but a moral one. The precise question which the jury 
was on hand for was being answered by someone else. 
Under cover of clinical jargon, many psychiatrists 
smuggled in their own moral outlook on responsibility. 
And since the psychoanalytic image of man is relatively 
a more deterministic one, the bias was toward acquittal. 
The chief problem was that the testimony did not sound 
like it evidenced a moral outlook; it sounded like eli-
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nical fact, it seemed like science. Nor was cross-examina-
tion much of a help in uncovering the soft parts. Cross-
examining a psychiatrist is like arguing with Alice's 
Humpty Dumpty-when he uses a word, it means 
"whatever he wants it to mean, no more, no less." (You 
will recognize that, coming from a lawyer, this is praise, 
not condemnation.) 
The only cure for psychiatric testimony is more psy-
chiatric testimony. An attorney simply found a psy-
chiatrist who resolved the "responsibility" question 
differently and who would translate that into the frame-
work of the "right-wrong" instruction. When accounting 
for the wide disparity of psychiatric opinions, most 
point to the facts that mental health and mental illness 
are elusive concepts, that various· schools of thought 
have arisen, that the mind of man is, after all, a compli-
cated thing. After accounting for all this, there is still 
more disagreement among psychiatrists inside the court 
room than out. The reason is that outside they pursue 
answers to clinical and therapeutic questions. Inside, 
moral judgments are mixed in. 
The Idea of ··substantial Capacity" 
The call of the psychiatric community and others 
for a more modern insanity instruction was finally an-
swered in most jurisdictions by the adoption of the 
"substantial capacity" test which both introduced vo-
litional defect as the basis for insanity and removed the 
absolutist language of the "right-wrong" test for cogni-
tive defect. Psychiatrists are now free to give a greater 
range of clinical evidence since evidence tending to 
show volitional defect is no longer ruled inadmissable 
as irrelevant. But, and this is an important but, the new 
test for insanity, while it permits more clinical informa-
tion, is not itself a clinical question. When one reads 
it, the word "substantial" jumps off the page. That 
word, at first blush a term of quantity or quality or both, 
is ultimately a term of judgment. To illustrate, my five~ 
year-old son Karl, when he wants more milk than usual , 
asks for "too much milk." I keep trying to explain to 
him the difference between a term of quantity-like 
"eight ounces of milk" -and terms of judgment-like 
"too much milk"- but he persists. (I think he under-
stands it now but likes to hear the lecture.) 
Precisely the same mistake is made when a psychia-
trist is asked to render an opinion on whether or not a 
given defendant had the "substantial" capacity to know 
wrongfulness or to conform conduct. The word sub-
stantial only has meaning if there is an external refer-
ent. If I asked a psychiatrist whether X has the substan-
tial mental stability to work in a nuclear plant, I would 
not take "no" as inconsistent with his earlier opinion 
that X had the substantial mental stability to drive a car. 
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When we ask the "substantial-capacity" question m a 
criminal trial , what is at bottom being asked is whether 
the defendant's capacity was substantial enough to visit 
on him the moral responsibility for his conduct. When 
the psychiatrist is asked this question, he is being asked 
to shift from giving clinical data to making a moral 
judgment. The worst part of this is that the shift is not 
noticed by the jury. He appears rather to be making a 
scientific interpretation from facts. Of course it is abso-
lutely necessary, if we are to understand him at all, for 
a psychiatrist to make interpretive judgments about 
the clinical data at hand. What must be kept clearly in 
focus, however, is the distinction between interpreta-
tion wholly within the realm of expertise and the moral 
judgment which is the peculiar province of the jury. 
To clarify, consider an expert at accident reconstruc-
tion, with a physics background, being asked to esti-
mate, from hard data found at the scene of an automobile 
accident, the speeds at which the involved vehicles 
were traveling when they collided. After testifying to 
the length of skid marks, the type of road surface and 
tires involved, after a dazzling exposition of the theory 
of "conservation of momentum," and after some dis-
claimer based on uncontrollable variables, the expert 
finally tells us that in his opinion vehicle A was travel-
ing 30 miles an hour and vehicle B was traveling 20 
miles per hour. I believe him so far, don't you? But now 
he is asked if, in his opinion, vehicle A was traveling 
"too fast." He wouldn't be allowed to testify, but even 
if he were, why should we do more than feign polite 
attention? "Too fast" is either a strictly legal question 
which we can resolve by looking at the posted speed 
limif, or a prudential (even slightly moral) question 
about how to drive. The important thing to note is that 
even if the expert testifies that 30 m.p.h. is or is not 
"too fast," the jury is not misled into believing that 
such is a scientific opinion. Rather the jury feels confi-
dent in overruling that interpretation if it disagrees 
with it. 
It might be argued that this analogy is unfair because 
the science of psychiatry does not admit of such precise 
quantitive or qualitative analysis, that much more de-
pends on interpretation. This, however, suggests that 
it is even more important in connection with psychiatry 
to restrict the expert to his given field since there is 
no quantity or quality within the jury's experience 
against which to measure such interpretation. The jury 
may believe our accident reconstructionist, but only 
because it agrees with his interpretation. When the jury 
agrees with the psychiatrist, it is sometimes because it 
understood nothing at all of what he said. This is of 
course compounded by the fact that with the psychiatrist 
"facts" are often the product of interpretation and not 
the basis for it. 
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A cardinal rule at common law stated that no witness, 
expert or otherwise, could testify to an "ultimate issue 
of fact." Th•_ls, while an eyewitness to a collision might 
state that the driver "was traveling 80 miles per hou r," 
or "swerved across the center line," he could not testify 
that the driver was "negligent" if such was an ultimate 
i sue in the case. This rule has been largely discarded 
and I only wish to say that my proposal bears no inten-
tion of reviving it. If the ultimate issue is a question of 
physics, a physicist should be permitted to answer it 
(though, as always, the jury may choose to answer it 
differently). If it is a question of psychiatry, a psychia-
trist should likewise be permitted to state his opinion. 
My point is only that the ultimate issue of insanity is 
a moral question and thus, referable solely to the ju ry. 
Although there appears no ideal solution, I submit 
that a scheme for managing the insanity defense 
approaches the currently optimal solution when it 
atisfies these criteria: 1) it permits the widest possible 
range of expert psychiatric testimony on matters within 
uch special expertise; 2) it forecloses psychiatric testi-
mony on matters outside such expertise; 3) it assigns 
the question of moral responsibility exclusively and un-
problematically to the jury. 
The ''Justly-Held-Responsible" Test 
To this end, I suggest two changes. First, the judge 
must not permit any interpretive judgments of an ex-
pert without a full prior exposition of the data on which 
it is based; moreover, the expert may not give an opin-
ion expressed in the language of the insanity definition. 
econd, the instruction on insanity should read: "A 
person is 'insane' if, as a result of mental disease or de-
fect, he cannot be justly held responsible for his conduct." 
The jurors are further instructed that the prosecution 
must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt and that 
they should consider all the testimony but not leave it 
untested against their own common sense and life exper-
ience. This "justly-held-responsible" test is a century-
old idea which never went further than academia. (I 
wouldn't bet the ranch on its going anywhere else now 
either.) When put forth in the past, however, the sup-
porting argument was that "insanity" as a clinical matter 
was not yet well-enough understood to permit a better 
definition. It was proposed in desperation. I support 
it, instead, because it is not a good clinical definition, 
because it subordinates all clinical interpretation to 
moral judgment. 
Testing "justly-held-responsible" against the above-
stated criteria, such scheme offers great latitude to expert 
testimony. Both cognitive and volitional defects are 
relevant; the expert may, with proper foundation, give 
opinions on the quantity or quality of defendant's capac-
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ity in each regard. Not only may he testify fully to 
these matters, but his testimony is not funneled into 
jargon foreign or incoherent to him. He may testify 
that the defendant "cannot tell right from wrong," or 
that defendant "has substantial capacity," but he is not 
forced to view the problem in those terms. The second 
criterion is met because no expert is permitted to render 
an opinion on whether the defendant may be "justly 
held responsible" for his conduct. As to the third cri-
terion, the moral question of responsibility is put 
squarely to the jury. 
One objection to such an open-ended instruction, 
put forth by Abraham Goldstein of the Yale Law School 
in his book The Insanity Defense, is that it gives the jury 
no guidance, leaves it psychologically naked with no 
impression that it follows, and thus can draw protection 
from, a legal standard. The fact is that the "substantial-
capacity" test really gives no guidance either, though it 
may give the false impression of doing so. The effect 
of that false impression may, in some cases, lead the jury 
to abdicate its responsibility to expert witnesses or to 
the meaningless words of a "test" for insanity. Although 
we would ordinarily prefer a clearer standard to a vague 
one, the issue is simply not amenable to more clarity 
without the serious side effects noted earlier. 
One other feature of the open-ended instruction is 
important and sets it apart from all other suggested 
modifications. Those who argue for new "tests," new 
"verdicts," or new "burdens" begin with the premise, 
sometimes expressed but often not, that the prevailing 
rules generate either too many acquittals or too few. 
The move from "right-wrong" to "substantial capacity" 
was prompted by a belief that the former, because it 
excluded the volitionally-incapable, convicted people 
it should not. The GBMI verdict was clearly a reaction 
to acquittals of notorious defendants. I do not know 
whether the "justly-held-responsible" instruction will 
produce more acquittals than any other scheme or less, 
and it is not the intention of the proposal to do either. 
The number of acquittals depends on the community's 
sense of morality as expressed through its representa-
tive, the jury. The acquittal rate may fluctuate with 
new insights from psychiatry and as public opinion on 
the issue ebbs and flows. Such fluctuation is not patho-
logical-it shows that the moral dialogue continues 
unaffected by artificial determinants. 
One cannot even tell whether or not the "justly-held-
responsible" test would have changed the Hinckley 
outcome. Juror Copelin could not so easily claim that 
the jury was "locked in by the law." My own guess is 
that the result would not have been different. I don't 
think the jury was "locked in" by the law; prosecution 
expert witnesses had testified that Hinckley did have 
substantial capacity. Perhaps they were locked in by a 
belief that conviction in such a case was not morally 
defensible. Under the open-ended "justly-held-respon-
sible" test, such belief is all that can, or should, ever 
lock a jury in. C: 
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Ground Zero 
We are on harbor-watch. 
Our anchor is ephemeral. 
Bones surrender, 
and the sun's radiance 
bursts through our dust. 
Words hang to the wind 
like a torn flag, 
and the last light of one 
of many afternoons 
slides 
along ordinary walls. 
This is the final emblem. 
We are on harbor-watch 
under a sorrow 
of metaphors. 
Nun's Secret 
She offered her Savior 
the laminated circles 
of her winterbreath. 
She offered him 
this counterpoint 
to her darkened spirit. 
Her prayer, enigmatic, 
was hidden like an undergrowth 
of bark. She prayed: 
Let me walk with Your shadow. 
Let me know. 
And now, late at night, 
her hands dare enfold 
in the presence of the unseen. 
These hands 
that touch the untouched, 
are the essence of her prayer. 
Rudolf Wittenberg 
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